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NRC INSPECTION MANUAL PDND
INSPECTION PROCEDURE 37801
SAFETY REVIEWS, DESIGN CHANGES, AND MODIFICATIONS
AT PERMANENTLY SHUTDOWN REACTORS
PROGRAM APPLICABILITY:  2561
SALP FUNCTIONAL AREA:  N/A
37801-01 INSPECTION OBJECTIVES
01.01 To verify whether the licensee's safety review program at
decommissioning power reactors is effective at contributing to
public health and safety and the environment.  This review also
assesses the effectiveness of training applicable to the safety
review process.
01.02 To ascertain whether facility design changes, tests,
experiments, and modifications (CTEMs) are effectively conducted,
managed, and controlled during plant decommissioning.
01.03 To verify that major and minor decommissioning activities
do not involve an unreviewed safety question (USQ) or change to
technical specification (TS).
37801-02 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
02.01 Decommissioning Safety Review Program
a. Review the licensee's safety review process and procedures
and assess whether they are adequate to identify an USQ
and/or change to TS resulting from CTEMs.  Determine whether
the program conforms to 10 CFR 50.59.
b. Evaluate the conduct of the licensee's offsite and/or onsite
safety review committees and assess their contribution
towards plant safety.  Determine whether these committees are
appropriately staffed and trained and are fulfilling their
charter, as defined in the licensee's TSs, licensee quality
assurance (QA) plan, or other licensing documentation.
c. Ascertain whether the licensee's training program provides
effective periodic training for personnel preparing,
reviewing, and approving safety evaluations.  Verify that the37801 - 2 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
training and qualification of the personnel conducting the
50.59 training is consistent with license requirements.
Determine whether the licensee has established a process to
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02.02 Design Changes, Test, Experiments, and Modifications
a. Review the procedures that control and implement design CTEMs
and assess whether the procedures provide adequate
instructions to assure proper implementation, review, and
approval.
b. Select a sample of design changes and/or modifications that
will result or have resulted in changes to the facility.
Determine whether the activities were properly implemented,
controlled, and contributed to plant safety.  This review
should also include any tests or experiments conducted for
the purpose of decommissioning.  Assess the details of the
safety evaluations, evaluate whether the licensee's safety
judgements  were appropriate, and determine whether key
considerations were effectively evaluated.
c. Based on the sample above, verify that the selected CTEMs
have been reviewed and approved in accordance with licensee
procedures and regulatory requirements, such as the TSs and
QA Plan.  Confirm that effected procedures, drawings,
maintenance records, and operator training were updated to
reflect the CTEM.  Assess whether alarm setpoints, and
calibration and operating requirements were revised, if
required.  Confirm that the licensee adequately evaluated any
inter-relationships  between the modification and other
systems affected by the activity.
Review a sample of safety evaluations written for the conduct
of decommissioning.  Verify that the licensee updated their
Final  Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), or equivalent, as
required by 50.71, and Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Report
(PSDAR) or license termination plan (LTP), if required, and
has adequate controls to maintain the licensed configuration
of the facility.
d. Select a sample of procedures that have been revised or
implemented to reflect the power reactor state of
decommissioning.  Ascertain whether an USQ and/or change to
the TS resulted.  This review should also focus on emergency
preparedness, fire protection, and other procedures and plans
referenced in the TSs or license.
02.03 Major and Minor Decommissioning Activities
a. Select a sample of maintenance, repair, and/or work
activities to ascertain whether the licensee made changes to
their facility without invoking their safety review process.
b. Select a sample of structure,  system, or component
configuration changes made to place the facility in a post-
shutdown configuration.  Review these configuration changes
to ascertain whether they involved a defacto modification to
the facility as described in the FSAR (or equivalent).
37801-03 INSPECTION GUIDANCE37801 - 4 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
General Guidance
This inspection procedure resulted, in part, from long-term actions
taken by the NRC staff in response to NRC Bulletin 94-01,
"Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate Maintenance
Practices at Dresden Unit 1," power reactor decommissioning
rulemaking (61 FR 39278, July 29, 1996), and a determination that
NRC inspection of decommissioning power reactors provides
additional assurance that licensed activities will not be adverse
to public health and safety and the environment.  The primary
intent of this inspection procedure is to assure that each licensee
possesses and implements a safety review program that effectively
maintains decommissioning safety and the facility configuration as
described in their licensing basis.  Further, this IP provides
assurance that licensees will effectively perform safety
evaluations to ensure that NRC reviews are conducted prior to
changes, test, or experiments involving USQs or changes to TSs.
Plants holding a Part 50 license can use 50.59 to conduct CTEMs
(without prior NRC review)  not described in the FSAR (or
equivalent) provided that the CTEM's do not involve a change in TSs
or an USQ.  For plants undergoing  decommissioning, additional
requirements are set forth to provide assurance that
decommissioning CTEMs are properly evaluated by licensees.  These
additional  requirements are described in the NRC Staff Requirements
Memorandum, dated January 14, 1994, and codified by the power
reactor decommissioning rulemaking (61 FR 39278, July 29, 1996).
In particular, decommissioning CTEMs can be made without NRC staff
review, if they do not:  (1) foreclose the unrestricted release of
the site; (2) significantly increase decommissioning costs; (3)
cause any significant environmental  impact not previously reviewed;
or, (4) violate the terms of the existing license.
The inspector should coordinate with the PM to identify the safety
or regulatory significant CTEMs that are to be reviewed.  Depending
on the vintage of the plant and decommissioning schedule,
significant CTEMs may include large-scale system, component, soil,
or structural removal activities.
The PM will normally perform or participate in this inspection
procedure.  It is expected that this inspection procedure will be
periodically  performed; however, this inspection could be scheduled
prior to major decommissioning activities and after the CTEMs have
been approved by the licensee.  For significant activities, such as
reactor vessel and steam generator removal or segmentation of large
radioactive components, a small multi-disciplined inspection effort
may be required to assess the licensee's safety evaluations.  For
other activities, such as tank and small-bore piping removal, the
50.59 review could be performed by an individual inspector or PM.
If possible, prior to permanent shutdown, the PM and regional
representatives should determine which licensee activities and
potential CTEMs should be reviewed to provided assurance that
decommissioning activities can proceed safely.
Although this procedure applies to all phases of decommissioning,
a different set of concerns will dominate the safety envelope
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to complete all inspection requirements listed in this IP, nor is
the inspector limited to these inspection requirements listed if
safety issues are involved.  However, the objectives of this IP
shall be met.  Based on an assessment of licensee performance, the
inspector may choose to inspect any aspect of the licensee's safety
review process that could adversely affect public health and safety
or the environment.
Specific Guidance
The inspector should review and incorporate as necessary the
information described in IP 37001, "10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation
Program," as further guidance and clarification of the inspection
requirements in this IP.
Few inspectors are expert in every nuclear-related discipline.
Therefore the inspector should recognize when technical or
interpretive assistance is needed to effectively review a safety
evaluation or identify a safety concern.  This assistance can be
obtained through the Project Manager for headquarters technical
disciplines or the region manager responsible for site inspection.
The inspector should make every effort to reach a conclusion about
a safety issue or concern in time to discuss it with the licensee
prior to the exit meeting.
Recognizing failures of the licensee to comply with administrative
requirements of its 50.59 program is important; however,
recognizing failures of the licensee to adequately assess how a
CTEM will effect plant safety is more important.  Therefore, the
inspector should focus on safety.  The failure to prepare,
document, or adequately address or evaluate all questions pertinent
to a particular CTEM, in itself, may indicate inadequate
engineering or training more so than a safety concern.  However, if
the errors were a frequent occurrence, caused by a programmatic
inadequacy, or demonstrative of a failure to address obvious and
reasonable safety considerations (such as identifying all relevant
accident scenarios or failing to recognize a change to TS), then
the finding would be of significance.
03.01 Decommissioning Safety Review Program
a. The safety review process used by a licensee during
decommissioning should be comparable to the program utilized
by the licensee during power reactor operation, even with
possible changes to the  licensee's TS because of
decommissioning.  If a licensee pursues immediate component
removal or decommissioning following plant shutdown, the NRC
staff expects that the licensee's 50.59 program will be of
high quality.  The same may not be the case if a licensee
enters into long-term storage and then implements a 50.59
program that has not been exercised for a long period of
time.  In this latter case, the licensee may experience a
loss of expertise in the conduct of technical or safety
reviews due to staff changes.  In either case, the inspector
should assess whether the program:  (1) reflects the
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configuration; (2) incorporates the most recent regulatory
requirements and guidance; (3) applies appropriate management
and technical reviews; and, (4) includes appropriate quality
considerations to assure that safety questions, evaluations,
and justifications are performed and documented.
If performed by the licensee, the inspector should review the
highest tiered licensee safety  evaluation written that
evaluates whether decommissioning involves an USQ and/or
change to the TS.  Review of this document is important
because it would probably evaluate the current plant
configuration (a permanent shutdown condition) to a
decommissioned state assessing design basis accident(s),
normal and off-normal events, site characteristics, etc.  The
inspector should also review any sub-tiered SEs (written, for
example, for steam generator, reactor, and large component
removal) that refer to a general decommissioning safety
evaluation to assess whether an USQ and/or change to TS
exists for the particular activity to be conducted.  The
inspector should review SEs to:  (1) assess the rigor of
engineering and management reviews; (2) determine whether the
proposed activities are bounded by the general
decommissioning safety evaluation; and, (3) identify whether
the changes, tests, or experiments involve an USQ or changes
to TS.  NRC inspector/staff review of licensee safety
evaluations shall always be conducted after licensee
management approval of their documents and should be
inspected prior to the activity occurring, if possible.
b. The inspector should assure that the safety committees are
properly  staffed and members appropriately trained.  A
performance-based assessment should be performed to assure
that significant decommissioning activities are independently
and effectively reviewed, as required by the TSs, other
requirements, and docketed commitments.  The inspector and/or
PM should observe the conduct of a safety review committee
and assess the effectiveness of this review body at:  (1)
questioning risks and benefits and the technical adequacy of
the particular activity; (2) providing an independent safety
perspective; and, (3) contributing to plant safety through,
in part, the incorporation of lessons learned and experience.
The offsite safety review committee should also be assessed.
The administrative section of the TS will normally contain
audit and safety review committee requirements.  Herein,
licensee staff training and qualifications will typically
reference an ANSI standard.  The inspector should also assess
whether the safety review committee is made up of persons of
appropriate  technical expertise necessary to accomplish their
safety function during power reactor decommissioning.  The QA
Plan or other licensing basis documents may also describe the
licensee's plans for assuring effective safety reviews.
c. The inspector  should review the licensee's training and
qualification program for the individuals performing safety
evaluations and reviews to assure that the training is
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licensing basis documentation.  The training program should
be timely updated to assure that an accurate facility
configuration is presented to personnel who prepare and
review packages that results in a change, test, or
experiment.  Information provided to the control staff in the
form of plant procedures and drawings should also correctly
represent the facility  configuration and operation of
modified systems and components.
03.02 Design Changes, Test, Experiments, and Modifications
a. The NRC staff expects that the procedures that govern the
control and implementation of decommissioning design changes
and modifications will be comparable in quality to the
procedures that were in use when the plant was in operation.
However, based on the safety significance of the structures,
systems, and components (SSCs), the level of quality
assurance applied by the licensee in the procedures may be
different between systems that assure safe storage of spent
fuel or monitor for radioactive effluents and those SSCs that
don't.  The inspector should review the licensee's QA Plan or
other licensee document  (such as a safety qualification
manual, Q-list, or other listing of equipment safety
classification) to ascertain the level of quality that will
be provided to SSCs of importance and evaluate whether the QA
controls and verifications applied by the licensee on these
systems  are appropriate.  The licensee's 10 CFR 50.65
maintenance rule implementation program may also provide
insights into equipment classification.
For SSCs (still described in the FSAR) determined by the
licensee as being of lesser importance than SSCs associated
with spent fuel storage, the procedures and associated
controls could have less rigorous quality elements applied to
provide a comparable level of assurance that the design
changes and/or modifications of these  SSCs would be
appropriately implemented and completed.  These SSCs may
include large component removal; building and ventilation
changes and dismantlement; and, contaminated/irradiated
system removal.  The inspector should also verify that
appropriate administrative requirements exist to maintain the
licensed configuration of the plant.
b. Attention should be focused on the structures, systems, and
components necessary to safely store or transport spent fuel
or highly irradiated materials or monitor for radioactive
effluents.  The inspector should verify that safety
evaluations are performed as required; that drawings and
procedures are updated in a timely  fashion; and, that
appropriate training is performed to assure that personnel
properly operate and maintain the effected structure, system,
or component.
If this review includes an Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Facility, NMSS inspection procedures 60854, "Preoperational
Testing of an ISFSI," and IP 60855, "Operation of an ISFSI,"
may be used as inspection guides.37801 - 8 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
In regard to the transportation or storage of spent fuel,
NMSS inspection procedures 60854 and 60855 predominately
focus on activities associated with the ISFSI, not with
licensee activities and controls in or about the spent fuel
pool.  Therefore, for the implementation of this IP, the NRC
staff should focus on the areas not reviewed by the NMSS SFPO
procedures.  This would include reviews and evaluations for
safe load pathways and heavy load drop scenarios and the
review of the engineered features designed to mitigate impact
failure of structures, systems, and components (SSC) should
a transfer cask free fall or impact an SSC or adversely
effect the operation of the shutdown power reactor.
Similarly, inspector review of 50.59 safety evaluations
written for the transfer of irradiated fuel should include an
assessment of human performance  for the certified fuel
handlers.  This may include:  operator command and control;
supervisory oversight; man-machine interface changes; and,
training.  During these assessments the inspector should
refer to IP 60705, "Preparation for Reactor Fuel Handling,"
and IP 60710, "Reactor Fuel Handling Activities," for
additional inspector guidance regarding the training and
conduct of irradiated fuel handling.
The inspector should verify that the licensed configuration
of the facility does not change without appropriate licensee
and/or NRC staff reviews, if required.  The inspector should
use the descriptions provided in the FSAR, PSDAR, LTP, or any
other docketed commitment that provides details as to plant
configuration.  Other examples important for inspector review
include spent fuel pool heat-up or evaporation tests; load
testing of polar, refueling, or other cranes; and, special
dismantlement  activities involving highly irradiated or
contaminated materials and components.  The inspector should
be aware of licensee plans or actions that modify, remove, or
redistribute soils and potentially  affect ground water
transport.  Changes in radiological effluent pathways could
jeopardize licensee radiological assessments, environmental
impact evaluations, and NRC safety judgements used to assess
decommissioning.
Other changes and modifications observed by the NRC staff
include the deactivation of systems and components, the
replacement of cooling systems with lower capacity systems,
and modifications to containment to facilitate
decommissioning.  Licensees could also pursue the removal or
modification of electrical distribution, fire protection
systems, and ventilation systems.  For example, modifications
to a plant heating system led to freezing and bursting of
piping systems located within containment at one
decommissioning power reactor.  These conditions within
containment also had the potential for freezing and bursting
of the fuel transfer tube which could have resulted in a
partial draindown of the spent fuel pool.
c. The inspector should assess whether the licensee is timely in
updating and maintaining accurate design and configuration
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control location.  NRC staff has identified that during the
conduct of time-aggressive decommissioning, some licensees
have been challenged in maintaining their documents up-to-
date detailing the status of a particular system at a
particular moment in decommissioning.  For SSCs for which
work is well defined within physical boundaries, this does
not typically represent a problem.  However, during some
decommissioning work, interfaces and interferences between
SSCs could be subtle and harder to identify.  Such situations
could involve SSCs shared between units, structural
modifications, heavy lifts, etc.
The inspector should verify that the licensee's processes
capture the safety evaluations necessary for the periodic 10
CFR 50.71(e) or PSDAR/LTP updates, as required.
d. The inspector should focus on the procedures that control
design changes, modifications, system operation, spent fuel
management, and other activities of regulatory concern.
These other activities could include radiation sampling and
survey, transportation, fire protection, and emergency
preparedness.  The inspector should assess whether reductions
in procedural reviews, details, or requirements adversely
impacted quality of activities governed by those procedures
or the level of safety assurance required by regulatory
requirements.
Throughout decommissioning, the risks associated with long-
term storage or dismantlement and decontamination will
generally reduce due to reductions in the radiological source
term; general area radiation dose; external threat to safe
fuel storage; etc.  Therefore, the NRC staff expects that
licensee's will review and implement, as required, changes to
their programs, plans, and procedures to reflect the current
decommissioning safety risk.  For example, adequate measures
should be taken by the licensee (such as revising their fire
protection plan or procedure) to account for additional fire
loading in containment or other plant area caused by
decontamination, torch cutting, or dismantlement activities.
Similarly, if conditions present less risk, the licensee
could possibly implement fewer response actions to gain an
equivalent level of assurance that public health and safety
would not be impacted.  No matter the situation, the
inspector should assess whether the licensee's plans reflect
the status of the decommissioning power reactor and
decommissioning activities being conducted.
03.03 Major and Minor Decommissioning Activities
a. Although  maintenance and repair generally do not involve USQs
or changes to TSs, the inspector should select a number of
maintenance and repair activities to assess whether these
activities involved CTEMs without a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.
The inspector should review control room or maintenance
planning information to select activities that may have a
high possibility of resulting in a change to the facility.
Examples of such changes could include TS systems including,37801 - 10 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
but not limited to, the spent fuel pool cooling pump
rebuilds, radiological effluent or criticality monitoring
instrumentation  replacement, spent fuel rack repairs, or
spent fuel pool heat exchanger tube plugging.  Other examples
could include the removal or modification of a building,
contouring or excavation of soil and foundations, and
diversion of rain water and sewage system effluent.  Licensee
work procedures should have a mechanism to determine whether
a safety evaluation is needed.
b. The inspector should select a sample of SSC configuration
changes made by the licensee to place the power reactor in a
post-shutdown  condition or other particular state of
decommissioning.  Typically, a licensee could use their work
control, maintenance, design change, or modifications
processes to conduct these changes.  For example, after final
plant shutdown, the licensee may isolate particular portions
of systems no longer necessary for safe decommissioning
operations.  These systems could include portions of service
water, component cooling water, electrical, fire water, or
radiation effluent monitoring.  A licensee may perform these
isolations using originally installed valves, blind flanges,
or they may use freeze seals.  However, the use of freeze
seals and the long-term isolation of portions of an operating
system (as described in the FSAR) may constitute a
modification, whether or not the licensee used originally
installed valves.  Also, any change in the design of an SSC,
whether in existence prior to or after final shutdown as a
result of an error or cognitive decision during modification
or maintenance, is considered a defacto modification  or
change to the facility.  Plant decommissioning with a defacto
modification or change must be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR
50.59, as necessary, to determine whether it involves an
unreviewed safety question or change in TSs.
Of similar importance, is the verification that SSCs credited
in the licensing basis as preventing or mitigating design
basis occurrences are available to fulfill their function.
If the power reactor safety analysis as described in the
licensing basis depends on or credits the availability of
such SSCs (whether or not described in the TSs), then
removing these SSCs from service during  decommissioning
should be evaluated in accordance with 50.59.  These types of
systems could  include spent fuel pool condensate water
transfer and system for refill capability, fire water and
detection systems, instrumentation systems for effluents and
radiation levels, etc,.  For definitions and examples of
major and other decommissioning activities refer to Manual
Chapter 2561, "Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection
Program."
37801-04 RESOURCE  ESTIMATE
Inspection resources for this inspection procedure will vary from
site to site based on NRC management's assessment of licensee
performance.  In addition, inspection resources will be dependentIssue Date:  08/11/97 - 11 - 37801
on the phase of decommissioning being implemented.  It is estimated
that during most active periods of decommissioning approximately 32
onsite inspection hours will be needed to adequately assess and
document licensee performance semi-annually.
37801-05 REFERENCES
1. Inspection Manual Chapter 9900, 10 CFR 50.59, "CFR
Discussions, Changes To Facilities, Procedures, and Tests (Or
Experiments)"
2. NUREG 0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants.
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